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FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCESS
SYLVESTER C. SMITH, JR.*

The publication of the Landis Report on Regulatory Agencies last December to President-Elect Kennedy' was, according to old friend, Carl McFarland, a "Christmas present" to
those with professional interest in policy aspects of federal
administration.' In my judgment, however, it was more than
that. In the language of Professor Arnold Toynbee, it represents a "challenge". What will be the "response" of the Bench,
the Bar, the universities and the Federal and State Bar Associations?
It is now clear that the concept of control of important segments of the economy by legislative delegation of power to a
so-called independent agency was never really analyzed by its
creators or, for that matter, by students of law and government, for many years. This is especially true of the impact of
the process on traditional concepts of separation of powers.'
The Attorney General's Report in 1941 on Administrative
Procedure in the Government Agencies pointed out earlier
delegations by the Congress to administrative agencies.' The
states, as the laboratories of "social and economic experiments' had created agencies to control the problems of health,
agriculture and increasing industrialization. In fact, the first
challenge to the administrative process came in the states and
was directed against delegation of legislative and quasi-judicial functions to municipal bodies or state commissions.!
There was until recently no common definition of terms
* President-elect of the American Bar Association; General Counsel.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America; Former Chairman, Section on Administrative Law-A.B.A.
1. The report is now a Committee print for the use of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
2. See McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in the
Wilderness, 47 Va. L. Rev. -373, 374 (1961).
3. See Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev.
614, 616-617 (1927), and the authorities cited therein; Jaffe, Basic Issues:
An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev., 1273, 1279 (1955); Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply
to Mr. Kintner, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 199, 202-203 (1960).
4.
See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 et. seq. (1941).
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting; Stone, J. concurring).
6.
For a description of the earlier State regulation of railroads, See I

SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE

14-16.

COMMERCE

COMMISSION (1931),

pp.
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either at Federal or State levels. The semantics varied. At
first, my good friend, the late Arthur Vanderbilt, called the
problem and method "municipal law", probably because many
of the early cases dealt with municipal or state administrative agencies. At that time it appeared that the whole method
of government regulation by an agency appeared to be a legal
problem. Moreover, because of our tripartite form of government, the method had constitutional limitations.7 Today we
are generally agreed in calling the method of government the
"Administrative Process".
Despite the earlier federal developments, it was not until
the advent of the New Deal that there was recognition of the
potential of the administrative process as a means of transforming society, especially one in the throes of a depression.
After the invalidation of the National Recovery Act,' President Roosevelt abandoned the attempt to impose a comprehensive administrative framework on the American economy.
Instead, new agencies were created to handle problems in selected economic areas.' Thus evolved the system of administrative agencies which the critics and commentators dubbed the
"alphabet soup" of Washington. Other critical phrases were
current in the late 30's such as "government by regulators",
"substituted legislators who are also executives". The extreme critics even referred to "government by dictatorship
of the Executive Branch", a less felicitous phrasing of the
problem than the Lord Chief Justice of England Hewart's title
"The New Despotism"."°
In considering the conflict between those who viewed the
emergence of the expanded administrative process in the federal jurisdiction as a threat to our form of government and
those who hailed it as the answer to our gravest economic
and social problems, the words of Mr. Justice Stone at the
Harvard Tercentenary in 1936 are refreshing and shed light
rather than heat. He said :"1
"Rarely in the history of the law has such an oppor7. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 (1928); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Corp v. United States,
295 U. S. 495 (1935); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
8. Schechter Corp v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
9. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151;
The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. 717; The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401.
10. See HEWART, THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929).
11. Stone, The Common Law In the United States, .50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 17
(1936).
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tunity come to our profession to carry forward a creative
work which would enable the law to satisfy the pressing
needs of a changing order without the loss of essential
values. The ultimate establishment of equity, after a period of resistance, as a coordinate branch of the law, ameliorating the rigors of the common-law system and translating in some measure moral into juristic obligations, is
a comparable transition in the law. The profession of our
day, like its predecessors who saw in the pretensions of
the chancellor but a new danger to the common law, has
given little evidence that it sees in this new method of
administrative control any opportunity except for resistance to a strange and therefore unwelcome innovation.
" * * * These warnings should be turned to account,
not in futile resistance to the inevitable, or in efforts to
restrict to needlessly narrow limits activities which administrative officers can perform better than the courts,
but as inspiration to the performance of the creative service which the bar and courts are privileged to render in
bringing into our law the undoubted advantages of the
new agencies as efficient working implements of government, surrounded, at the same time, with every needful
guarantee against abuse."
The ideas of Mr. Justice Stone, even though not immediately adopted, reflect a turning point in the attitude of the
Bench and Bar toward the administrative process. James
Landis, the distinguished former Dean of Harvard, was correct in telling the American Bar Association's Administrative
Law Section last September that the first era in the recent
history of the federal administrative process featured a challenge to its authority and adoption. He well said:"
"After a decade of the New Deal most of the Bar that
had been in opposition to the growth of the administrative
process felt that neither a roll-back of the achievements
of the New Deal nor of the manner it utilized to recognize
through the administrative process the multitude of
claims that it had sponsored was possible or desirable.
There was a short upsurge of the opposition for a time
with the introduction of the original Walter-McCarran
Bill. But wiser heads prevailed on both sides. With the
able Attorney General's report in 1941, the attention of
both sides was directed toward the improvement rather
than the contraction of the administrative process."
The second stage in the recent history of the federal ad12. Landis, The Administrntive Process: The Third Decade, 47 A.P.A.J.
135, 136 (1961).
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ministrative process was the period of constructive action to
improve its procedure. An unbiased view must admit that
the first great step was President Roosevelt's creation of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure."
The Report was issued in 1941 (with some prophetic dissent
in important areas by McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt)"
and is still worthy of study. The war intervened before effective implementation could occur.
It was the failure to get some action that led the Administrative Law Committee of the ABA, of which I was Chairman in 1944, to make its decision that it would try to prepare
a draft of an Administrative Procedure Act that could at least
receive approval of the House of Delegates. On that Committee I had the devoted aid and assistance of the late William
Clarke Mason of the Philadelphia Bar, Dean Roscoe Pound,
Carl McFarland, a tower of strength and partner of Homer
Cummings, and Ralph Hoyt of Milwaukee.
I cannot remember the number of drafts our Committee
submitted to the members of the House of Delegates, Section
Chairmen and many others asking for criticism, before going
before the House of Delegates. The criticism came. Most of
it was constructive. Some denounced the proposal as too mild
and many wanted a much broader judicial review. We consulted a number of practitioners before the various agencies,
as well as the agencies themselves. The agencies, when they
understood our Committee was trying to do a constructive job
and not hamstring them, offered helpful criticism. The resuit
was that the Committee's draft was submitted to the House
of Delegates in February, 1944, and approved by an overwhelming vote." Most of the opposition came from members
who had no use for any administrative agency.
From then on the work of the ABA and the State Bar Associations in urging the Congress to enact and the President
to sign the Bill was praiseworthy. The changes and compromises made were basically of two kinds: those requested by
practitioners on details, and those requested by the Administrative for reasons that appeared sound. The support given
13. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S.
I)oc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 251 et. seq. (1941).
14.
15.

Id., 203 et. seq.
See 69 A.B.A. Rep. 438-442; 471-473 (1944).
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by Attorneys General Biddle and Clark and the Administration augured well for acceptance by most of the agencies of
the spirit of the law. In the Senate, the late Senator McCarran, and in the House, Representatives Hatton W. Summers
and Francis E. Walter were towers of strength in pressing
for enactment." Later the Supreme Court decisions upholding
the requirements of the Act gave it life and body."
If the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 was not the
perfect solution, it was at least a great stride forward. There
had been, of necessity, compromises; and there were to be
disappointments. One of these was the failure of the Administrative Act to achieve an actual separation of functions in
the administrative agencies. As Judge Henry J. Friendly of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently said:"
"I trust no one is so naive as to think the separation of
staff function decreed by the Administrative Procedure
Act really works."
Now, fifteen years later, as the Landis report dramatically
demonstrates, we are required to take another look at the federal administrative agencies. In the interim, there have been
the Administrative Procedure Conference of 1953," the Hoover report of 1955," especially the recommendations of the Task
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure. In response to
these latter developments, the House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted, on February 20, 19561 a series of resolutions, con-

stituting the comprehensive legislative program relating to
the administrative process. Part of the program was embodied
in the proposed Federal Administrative Practice Reorganization Act of 1957.' Other phases would enact a new Code of
Federal Administrative Procedure to supersede the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946;' and would transfer to special courts part of the jurisdiction now exercised by the Federal Trade Commission and the jurisdiction of the NLRB ovei
16. See 92 Cong. Rec. 2148 et. seq.; 5647 et. seq.
17. See, e. g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950).
18. See Friendly, A Look at the Federni Administrative Agencies, 60
Colum. L. Rev. 429, 438 (1960).
19. See Conference on Administrative Procedure, First Report (1955).
20. See Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force Report on LJegal Services and Procedure (1955).
21. See 81 A.B.A. Rep. 371-386 (1956).
22. See S. 932, H. Ft. 3349, H. R. 3350 and H. R. 7006 (85th Cong., 1st
Sess.).
23. See S. 1887 (87th Cong., 1st Seas.) for the most recent version of thi.
legislation.
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representation and unfair practice cases."
Despite the vigorous efforts of the ABA membership, other
representatives of the legal profession, and the judiciary, the
proposed legislation has not been enacted. Indeed, there has
been little, if any, progress. Meanwhile, the Congress has, as
Carl McFarland reports, "become involved in an imbroglio over
an expose of questionable conduct of certain federal commissioners, overlooking the more prosaic-and much more important-problem of simple nonfeasance".' But, as Dean Landis correctly points out, "malfeasance to some degree will always characterize any human institution"." He turns, however, in his report to what the agencies have not done and to
the failure of the administrative process to vindicate the hopes
of its proponents."
The promise of the administrative process must be compared with its performance. Originally, it promised a disposition of matters:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

with promptness and dispatch;
at a minimal cost;
by expert and trained personnel;
in an atmosphere of procedural flexibility; and
in a context of broad rules, intelligently and carefully
drawn, for the guidance of the Government and interested parties.

What has been the performance of the Federal agencies?
First, instead of efficient and inexpensive dispatch of
agency business, the Landis report indicates that "inordinate
delay characterizes the disposition of adjudicatory proceedings
before substantially all of our regulatory agencies".' In a high
proportion of cases the administrative phase is not concluded
for a period of three or four years. Moreover, the Federal Power Commission, if it were to dispose of all its present and anticipated cases, could not become current until 2043 A.D., even
24. See 81 A.B.A. Rep. 378, 379 (1956). A Report of the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure of the American Bar Association to
be submitted at the Annual Meeting In St. Louis, Missouri, August 7-11,
1961, states that the Bill to establish "Specialized Courts will soon be ready
for introduction."
25. See McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying In the
Wilderness, 47 Va. L. Rev. "373, 376 (1961).
26. Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1960) p. 14.
27. Id., p. 15-17.
28. Id., p. 5.
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if its staff were tripled.' Other examples of protracted administrative litigation are given by Louis Hector in his incisive
memorandum to former President Eisenhower when he resigned from the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1959.' Judge Henry J.
Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who
is a Harvard Law School graduate, inquired in a recent speech
before students of Columbia Law School:
"I wonder whether law students still are taught, as
we were, to contrast the celerity of those Mercury-like
and wing-footed messengers, the administrative agencies,
with the creeping and cumbersome processes of the courts.
If they are, they have a rude awakening ahead, on both
counts." 3'
Second, instead of a decrease in costs, the administrative
process, as presently constituted, would tax the resources of
a Croesus and certainly excludes the possibility of resort to
its proceedings by the ordinary citizen or small corporation.
The size of the record, costing approximately a dollar a page,
the number of experts and the mountain of exhibits now considered desirable for an effective presentation of a case sweil
the cost. Nor should we overlook the cost to the Government
itself which, of course, is reflected in our taxes. These cases
sometimes involve numerous parties. In the Seven States Case
before the Civil Aeronautics Board, there were 150 parties
and interveners and 225 appearances were noted. In the
Phillips Petroleum Rate Case before the Federal Power Commission, 76 lawyers entered appearances for 33 parties and
interveners, the hearings consumed 82 days and oral argument an additional two days. The total cost, as you well can
see, ran into the millions. It should be noted, moreover, that
in this latter case the proceedings were initiated in 1948 and
the decision occurred in 1960."
There are, as the Landis report indicates, indirect costs of
incalculable dimensions. These stem, among other things, from
the factor of delay in the final determination. For example,
the expenditure of one hundred million dollars for steel con29. Id., p. 6.
30. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 Yale L. J. 930, 931 et. seq. (1960).
31. Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 429, 432 (1960).
32. Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1960) pp. 9-10.
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struction has been held up while the Federal Power Commission has delayed decision on the issuance of pipe line certificates. Was there not economic loss entailed when at that time
the country had unused capacity in steel and increasing unenmployment? In the field of air transportation, the failure of the
Civil Aeronautics Board promptly to issue certificates in air
route cases has caused serious dislocations in the procurement
of commercial aircraft.' This, coupled with military cutbacks,
has had a serious impact on the domestic aircraft industry.
Indeed, Dean Landis has stated that the failures of the administrative process have impeded the rate of our economic
growth, thus casting a shadow over our efforts to outstrip the
Soviet Union in the cold war."
Third, in describing the problems of expert personnel, Dean
Landis told the administrative Law Section' there was need
to re-examine "the truth of certain legends" that have enveloped the administrative process." The "possession of expertise", a phrase which he attributes to the late Harold Laski, is the first legend which he examines.
Although Dean Landis believes that a modicum of expertness still characterizes the work of the staff of the agencies,
he doubts seriously whether the commissioners themselves
qualify as experts in the fields they purport to administer.
The reasons for this are diverse. The political nature of the
appointments militates against the selection of the best qualified men.' Such appointments are viewed as political stepping
stones, or are considered as convenient points of departure
for entry into the industry which the administrator is supposed to regulate. Even if these conditions were corrected, the
present short term of the administrators is hardly condusive
to the development of expert knowledge or the desire to continue to serve the Government.' Without deprecating in any
33.
Id., p. 11
34.
N. Y. Times, April 14, 1961, p. 12, Col. 1.
35.
Landis, The Administrative Process: The Third Decade,
135, (1961).
36.
Id., p. 136.
37. Id., p. 136-137.

47 A.B.A.J.

38. Id., p. 137. See also, Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the
President-Elect", Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 2d Seas. (1960) p. 12-13.
39. See Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960) p. 68. See S. 1842 (87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961), for a legislative proposal to provide for uniform 10 year terms for members of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Maritime
Board, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the National Labor Relations Board and
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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way the need for trained and devoted personnel, I would like
to add a personal observation. No amount of so-called "expertise" is an adequate substitute for common sense and fair
dealing. I, personally, would prefer a quasi-judicial administrator who is blessed with common sense and keen perception to one who is steeped in expert knowledge.
Fourth, procedural flexibility, as compared to the supposed
rigidities of judicial administration, has been claimed as an
essential attribute of the administrative process."0 The relaxation of strict rules of evidence was considered to be a manifestation of this administrative flexibility." This noble experiment has failed totally. The indiscriminate admission of evidence "for what it's worth" has contributed delay and costs
which, as I have indicated, have plagued the administrative
process."2 As a matter of fact, the administrative process has
not kept pace with the reforms of judicial administration, particularly those manifested by the discovery and pre-trial mechanisms under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,
in the area of informal adjudication, which is a common practice in State Agencies," the Federal counterparts failed to demonstrate the "flexibility" attributed to them. The increase in
paper work and complicated forms of these agencies furnish
a good illustration of Parkinson's Law.'
Fifth, the administrative process has failed to formulate or
promulgate, in accordance with the original legislative intent
of the basic statutes establishing the agencies and the design
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946," broad rules for
the governance of those industries and individuals subject lo
the jurisdiction of the agency." Instead there has been an undue stress on the quasi-judicial or adjudicative function on an
40.
41.

I DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (1958) p. 39-40.
Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",

Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960)

p. 15.

42. Id., p. 3-11. See also Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 Yale L. J. 930, 931 et. seq. (1960).
See also, Friendly, A Look at the Federal Adminis-

43.

See Rules 26-37.

45.
46.
47.

See PARKINSON, PARKINSON'S LAW (1957).
5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958); 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
See Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its Place

trative Agencies, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 429, 432-435. The revised rules of the
Federal Trade Commission provide for pre-hearing conferences at which
the Hearing Examiners may direct counsel for either side to make use of
the "principles of discovery". See FTC release, July 6, 1961.
44. See, e. g., Kimball and Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 141, 171 et. seq. (1961).
in

the

Legal

Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1408 et. seq. (1955); cf. Baker, Policy by Rule
or Ad Hoe Approach-Which Should it Be? 22 Law and Contemp. Prob. 658
(1957).
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8
basis."
. As a result, there are volumes of reports of ad hoc
various agencies, but little of this material has precedential
value. Moreover, on numerous occasions, some agencies have
employed the facts and circumstances of an ordinary case as
a device to review a particular doctrine or series of rules. 9 This
practice distorts the purpose of ad hoc adjudication, unduly
delays determination of the actual issues presented by the
litigants and may, in some instances, be a subterfuge to avoid
the requirements that the Administrative Procedure Act imposes upon administrative rule making.' Section 4 (b) requires
that interested persons be allowed "to participate in rule making through submission of written date, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity to present the same orally . .. "
Subdivision (a) of that section provides that general notice of
proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Reg2
ister."
Another device to avoid the mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act is the issuance of press releases to invite interested persons to comment upon proposed revision of
doctrines or rules. Revisions are then announced in the same
manner, in each case without publication in the Federal Register. 3
The problem of quasi-legislative rule making an administrative agency is explored in the Landis report. There it is
considered an aspect of the far broader problem of agency
"policy formulation"." One of the fundamental reasons for the
failure of the administrative process to realize the bright
hopes of its supporters is, I am convinced, the failure of agencies (at least in recent years) to utilize fully the opportunities
that Congress conferred upon them to engage in legislative
rule making.' After all, it was precisely because Congress, beset with multitudinous national and international problems,
did not have the time to legislate in detail that it turned to
the administrative process. After establishing basic statutory
48. Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1960)

p.

2 et. seq.

49. See Peek, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 Yale L. J. 729, 738 et. seq. (1961).
50. Ibid, p. 732; 738 et. seq.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (b).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (a).
53.

See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor

Relations Board, 70 Yale L. J. 729, 735 et. seq. (1961).
54. Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(160) p. 22.
55.

See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor

Relations Board, 70 Yale L. J. 729, 730-731; 758-761 (1961).
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criteria to control administrative action, it expected the details of administration to be supplied by agencies, particularly
by the exercise of rule-making power." To improve this phase
of the administrative process should be one of the major tasks
of those who wish to achieve reform.
I venture to suggest some ideas for the improvement in the
near future of the administrative process. I have referred
earlier to the legislative proposals in the field of administrative law which were first enunciated in resolutions approved
by the House of Delegates in February, 1956."
Unfortunately, no legislation emerged from Congress. In
April of this year, however, President Kennedy created by an
Executive Order the Administrative Conference of the United
States.58 The purpose of the Conference is "to assist the President, the Congress and the administrative agencies and executive departments in improving existing administrative procedures". The Conference implements one of the recommendations of the Landis report. Its establishment is in line with
the ABA's proposal to create a division of administrative procedure in an Office of Administrative Procedure and Legal
Services. Since the Order establishing the Conference embraces the Executive Departments as well as agencies, it is
broader in scope than the Landis report and the ABA proposal. It contemplates the same type of intensive and extensive investigation of the Administrative Process as the Attorney General's Committee of 1939-41. 5'
President Kennedy, in accordance with the Order, appointed
a Council of eleven members.' The Conference has been expanded to include, as general members, practitioners, scholars and other persons conversant with Federal administrative
procedure.' The President has designated Judge E. Barrett
Prettyman, of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as Chairman," and has named Dean Landis as a member
56. For an earlier statement of this position, see LANDIS, "THE ADMININISTRATIVE PROCESS" (1938), 47 et. seq.
57. 81 A.B.A. Rep. 371-386 (1956). For recent legislative developments,
see footnote 87, Intra, and p. 17 et. seq., supra.
58. Executive Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233 (1961).
59. See Final Report of the Attorney CGeneral's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941).
60. Executive Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233, Sec. 1 (1961).
61. Id., Sec. 3.
62. Judge Prettyman, at the direction of former President Eisenhower,
had since August 29, 1960, been in charge of a project to create an Administrative Conference modeled after the Judicial Conference. Thus, he was
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of the Council." In addition to the eleven member Council, the
Conference consists of forty-four general members from Federal Government service and twenty-nine general members
outside Government service, of which twenty-one are lawyers
in private practice. It is regrettable that the American Bar
Association, whose Section on Administrative Law and Special
Committee on Legal Services and Procedures have been investigating deficiencies in the Administrative Process for a
number of years, has been accorded only two designated representatives in this eighty-six member Confeernce.
Meanwhile, there should be coordination of the efforts of
the ABA with state and local Bar Associations in order that
a concert of aims and objectives be prepared for presentation
to the Conference. In this concert of action, I believe that the
organized Bar should focus on two vital areas:
(1) The optimum development of legislative rule-making
power; and
(2) The preservation of the historic American tradition of
separation of powers.
RULE - MAKING
This is the area of the administrative process where, under
proper procedural safeguards outlined in the Administrative
Procedure Act, the agencies should elaborate the legislative
criteria of the basic statutes in order to establish rules for
the guidance of the important segments of the economy entrusted to their administration." Doubts were entertained, before the second Chenery case' in the Supreme Court of the
States, that the agencies could legislate interstitially without
the logical choice for appointment as Chairman of the new Administrative
Conference; moreover, he had previously served as Chairman of the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States which prepared a
Report on Procedure in Antitrust and other Protracted Cases. See Judge
Prettyman's testimony at hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate (86th Cong., 2d Sess.) November 29, 1960.
63. In addition to Mr. Landis. the President appointed the following:
Manuel F. Cohen, director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission; Walter Gellhorn, professor of law, Columbia University; Joseph P. Healy, vice president-general counsel of Boston-Edison
Company; Everett Hutchinson, chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission; John D. Lane, member of the firm Hedrick & Lane, Washington,
D. C.; Earl Latham Eastman, professor of political science, Amherst College; Carl McGowan, member of the firm Ross, McGowan and O'Keefe,
Chicago, Illinois; Nathaniel L. Nathanson, professor of law, Northwestern
University; Max D. Paglin, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission.
64. For an example of a failure of the administrative process to respond to the challenge of rule-making, see Peck, The Atrophied RuleWaking Powers of the National Labor Relations

Board, 70 Yale L.

(1961).
65. See Securities Comm'n. v. Chenery Corp. 332 U. S. 194 (1947).

J.
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resort to rule-making procedure." In that case, the issue was
whether the Commission by order could prohibit conduct (consisting of a possible conflict of interest on the part of officers
and directors of a company involved in a corporate reorganization), which it had not previously articulated in a rule-making proceeding." The Supreme Court of the United States
held that it could but nevertheless expressed a preference for
rule-making proceedings when it said:
"Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have
the ability to make new law prospectively through the
exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason
to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding
Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of
the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through
this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied
in the future.""
The guiding principles of administrative action should be
clearly and fully enunciated so that the public may know in
advance the rules of the game.
There is another persuasive reason for preferring rulemaking to ad hoc adversary adjudication. Well drawn rules
will furnish a guide to hearing examiners in such adjudication. This, in turn, may encourage the examiners to exercise
stricter supervision over the admission of evidence. Thus,
costs will be reduced and delay minimized or avoided.
Finally, formulation of reasonably precise rules and standards would facilitate informal adjudication. The advantages
of such adjudication have been demonstrated in the practice
of various State agencies." Its adoption in Federal agencies
where it does not now exist and its extension in those agencies
which now employ it should be encouraged. When, in February, 1956, the House of Delegates of the ABA approved the
sponsorship of a new Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, it recommended that there be included within such
Code a provision for informal adjudication, and such provi66.

See Securities Comm'n. v. Chenery Corp. 318 U. S. 80, 92-93 (1943).

See also 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1002; 1005 (1943).

67. See Securities Comm'n. v. Chenery Corp. 332 U. S. 194, 199-200 (1947).
68. Id., p. 202.
69. See Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 236
(1949).
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sion was made part of the bill which the ABA proposed to the
Congress."
In line with that resolution and proposal, I wish to add my
voice to the growing demand for simpler, informal proceedings. There appears to be no good reason why ex parte
proceedings, similar to those conducted before a judge, should
not play a role in the administrative process. Moreover, I do
not share the fear of some members of the Bar of informal
talks with administrators, and even advisory opinions by them.
I do, however, favor the adoption of a Code of Ethics for the
administrative process." But this of itself is not sufficient.
For, unless there is a substratum of integrity and morality
upon which to build, elaborate codes, the forms of procedure,
or the shape which substantive law assumes cannot prevent
corruption.
All ex parte contact, however, cannot be eliminated. To do
so would interfere with normal and necessary interchange of
experience between the agencies and those they regulate, and
2
local, state and national officials."
Moreover, the hearings disclosed that some of the contacts, with an inference of improper influence which were publicly denounced, occurred in
the field of formal adjudication." I do not believe, therefore,
that the institution of informal procedures will increase the
problems of those who strive to eradicate from these agencies
improper influence. What a reduction of paper work could be
achieved by the institution of informal proceedings. It may
even cause the partial repeal of Parkinson's Law.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

Time has sustained rather than invalidated the wisdom of
Montesquieu's "The Spirit of the Laws" or "De l'esprit des
lois". He postulated in his treatise the separation of powers
of government, into the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
branches, as an indispensable condition for the retention of
70. See S. 1887 (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) for the most recent version of the
legislation. See, particularly, section 1004 (b).
71. The American Bar Association has announced that the 1961 Ross
Essay Contest will be devoted to the following subject: "What Principles
and Provisions Should be Incorporated in a Code of Ethics for Administrative Agencies, and In What Manner Should the Code be Implemented?"
See 47 A.B.A.J. 206 (1961). See also, Ablard, Ex Parte Contacts with Federal Administrative Agencies, 47 A.B.A.J. 473 (1961).
72. Landis, "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect",
Committee Print, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1960) p. 14-15.
73. See Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. Federal Com. Com'n., 261 F.
2d 65 (CA, D. C., 1958), (Formal Adjudication); Sangamon Valley Television
Corp. v. United States, 269 F. 2d 221 (CA, D. C., 1959) (Rule-Making).
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political freedom. The experiences which we have had with
Fascist and Communist forms of totalitarianism in recent
decades should have reenforced our faith in the fundamental
doctrine of the separation of powers.
In the earlier decades of the administrative process, it was
insisted that some combination of Legislative, Executive and
Judicial powers was a requirement for the optimum functioning of the agencies."4 This pretension was to some extent accepted by many practicing lawyers and scholars as a dogmatic
5
verity."
Later, commencing with President Roosevelt's Committees on Administrative Management and Procedures" and
continuing after World War II, a considerable corpus of scholarship developed in opposition to such notions and in favor of
separation of powers." "Without doubt", said Professor Louis
Jaffe in 1956, "the most acute problem of our administrative
system is created by the so-called combination of prosecuting
and adjudicating functions within one agency.'" In this, Professor Jaffe, who eventually succeeded Mr. Justice Frankfurter as Byrne Professor of Administrative Law at the Harvard Law School, was echoing the words of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt," the creator of many of the present federal administrative agencies.
There is a difference of opinion in the bar as to whether
separate administrative courts, similar to the tax court" and
the old commerce court," should be established.' I venture to
74.
For a modern restatement of this position, see I DAVIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1958), p. 23. For the evolution of the views of
James M. Landis, compare LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938)
p. 1-2 with the Landis "Report on Regulatory Agencies to the

President-Elect", (1960) p. 15.
75. See, e.g., Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis,

30 N.Y.U.L. Rev., 1278-

1280 (1955).

76.

See President's Committee on Administrative Management,

with Special

Studies (1937);

Final

Report

Report of the Attorney General's

Com-

mittee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
77. Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal T\rade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 199 (1960);

Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev., 1273 (1955); Schwartz,
Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev.,

1390, 1406 et. seq. (1955); H-ector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 Yale L. J. 930, 960 et. seq. (1960).
78. Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. ReV., 1273, 1278 (1955).
79. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S.
Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.. p. 206 (1941).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 et. seq. (1958).
81. 36 Stat. 539 (1910); repealed 38 Stat. 208, 219 (1913). See FRANKFURTER

AND

LANDIS,

THE

BUSINESS

OF

THE

SUPREME

COURT,

(1927), 153-174, for the classic account of the brief career of the Commerce
Court.
82. Compare Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal Trade
Commission

199 (1960),

to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 Mich. L.

Rev.,

with Kintner, The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination, of
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suggest, however, that the position of the organized bar should
be inflexible in advocating within the agencies a realistic internal separation of powers and functions as between their
executive, legislative rule-making and adjudicative arms."
As part of this internal separation, I would enhance the
role and independence of the trial examiners in agency adjudication. A start was made in the Administrative Procedure
Act cf 1946," but it was never fully implemented. One of the
resolutions of the House of Delegates in 1956 would have established a division of hearing commissions, in an Office of
Administrative Procedure and Legal Services, to supervise
the recruitment of hearing commissioners and the administration of laws to be enacted governing such hearing commissioners or, as they are now called, trial examiners.'
A decision to enhance the role of the examiner must be accompanied by a resolve to raise the, standards for their recruitment, appointment, and service. This means an upgrading
of their salaries, an increase in their responsibilities, and a
chance for advancement within the agencies."
Despite the failure of Congress to act favorably on the ABA
proposals, it is presently considering a number of bills to reform the administrative process." These would implement one
Some Possible Defects, 44 A.B.A.J. 441 (1958); See also Jaffe, Basic Issues:
An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev., 1273, 1278 et. seq. (1955); Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its Place In the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1406
et. seq. (1955).
83. For a comment upon the ineffectiveness of the present Administrative Procedure Act, see Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 429, 438 (1960).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (c) and 5 U.S.C. § 1010.
85. See 81 A.B.A. Rep. 377 (1956).
86. See Rhyne, Developing the Prestige of the Hearing Examiner, 47
A.B.A.J. 184, 185 (1961); but see, Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 Colum. L. Rev., 429, 443 (1960).
87. The legislative program of the A.B.A. has been resubmitted to the
87th Congress as follows: Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, S.
1887, by Sen. Ervin; Federal Administrative Practice Act, H. R. 349, by Rep.
Fascell; Office of Federal Administrative Practice Act, S. 2189, by Sen.
Keating, The bill to provide Specialized Courts to exercise certain adjudicative functions of the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal
Trade Commission has not been reintroduced. See report of the Special
Committee on Legal Services and Procedures (A.B.A., 1961). Other bills
submitted without A.B.A. endorsement follow: H. Pt. 14, introduced by Rep.
Harris, January 3, 1961, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce (87th Cong. 1st Sess.) on which hearings have been
held but no report issued; H. R. 8140, introduced by Rep. Celler, July 13,
1961 (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) which has passed the House and is awaiting
action in the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedure of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The latter is a criminal statute designed
to eliminate bribery, graft and conflicts of interests from the Administrative Process and other governmental areas. Finally, there is H. R. 6784
(87th Cong., 1st Sess.) which would confer a "veto" power upon Congress
over administrative rules and regulations. See also Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate to the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report No. 168, 1961 (87th Cong.,
1st Sess.); and Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, November 29, 30, December.1 and 2, 1960 (86th Cong., 2d Sess.).
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or more of the ABA's proposals and the recommendations of
the Landis Report. One of the bills, S. 1842, introduced in May,
1961, by Senator John Carroll of Colorado (Chairman of, the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary), would provide for
uniform ten-year terms for members of certain administrative
agencies." This bill has not moved.
Another bill, S. 1734, introduced by Senator Carroll in Aprii,
1961, was referred to the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary." S. 1734 would amend Section 7 of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 to permit, inter alia, the agencies to
one or more members, and even to one or more examiners,
their duty to preside over hearings and make final decisions.'
Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act would be
amended so that, in cases where the agency has not presided
at the reception of evidence, the officer who presided shall
initially decide the case. In the absence of review by the agency, which is descretionary with it, the presiding officer's decision would, without further proceedings, become the decision of the agency. Review would be confined to the following four grounds: (1) clearly erroneous findings of material
fact; (2) legal conclusions without governing precedents or
departure from law, precedent or agency rule; (3) substantial
and important questions of administrative policy or discretion; (4) prejudicial procedural error.
Hearings were held in May and June, 1961, on S. 1734. A
number of witnesses have testified before the subcommittee
considering S. 1734. Whitney North Seymour, then President
of the American Bar Association, informed the subcommittee
that although he was in general agreement with the purpose
88. See Footnote 39, supra.
89. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) 1961.
90. The amended section would provide as follows: "(a) The agency
shall make the decision in cases in which it presides at the taking of evidence. In its discretion, by general rule or in specific cases, the agency may
delegate its duty to preside over hearings and make the' agency decision
to (1) one or moremembers of the body-which comprises the agency, or
(2) one or more examiners appointed as provides in this chapter. This Act
shall be deemed to supersede any statute which has heretofore limited the
authority of an agency to delegate authority to make any agency decision,
to the extent that such statute is inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act. The functions of all presiding officers and of officers participating In
decisions in conformity with section 8 of this Act shall be conducted in an
impartial manner. Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he deems
himself disqualified, and, upon the filing in good faith of a timely and
sufficient affidavit of personal disqualification of any such officer, the
agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in
the case."
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of the bill, he would prefer the enactment of a new Federal
Code of Administrative Procedure, such as had been earlier
sponsored by the ABA. Robert M. Benjamin of New York, a
Chairman of special ABA committee on a new Federal Code
for Administrative Procedure, concurred in these views. Mr.
Benjamin opposed piecemeal amendments of the Administrative Procedure Act."'
None of the proposals to improve the Administrative Process should be more interesting to this Judicial Conference than
S. 2189, introduced by Senator Keating on June 29, 1961 (87th
Cong., 1st Sess.) and referred to the Committee on Government Operations. This would establish an Office of Federal
Administrative Practice and provide for the appointment and
administration of a Corps of Hearing Commissioners who,

with enhanced salaries and responsibilities, would succeed the
present trial examiners.
In addition to these general proposals, there have been submitted to Congress various plans to improve practices and
procedures of specific agencies." The administration has been
sustained with respect to the plans submitted for the reorganization of the Civil Aeronautics Board" and the Federal
Trade Commission." On the other hand, it was unsuccessful in
persuading Congress to authorize the reorganization of the
Securities and Exchange Commission' and, more recently, the
National Relations Board." Moreover, it was compelled 'to ae91. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) 1961. The Subcommittee Report dated April
14, 1961 (S. Rep. 168, 87th Cong, 1st Sess.) stated that it had considered
the proposed Code of Administrative Procedure, S. 1887 (87th Cong., 1st
Sess.) which "is primarily the product of the American Bar Association,
and has the earnest support of that organization", but concluded: "While
the subcommittee has no illusion that the Administrative Procedure Act is
perfect-and is engaged in drafting specific changes in that act-there is
no basis for asserting that the act is so inadequate as to require its complete revision. Should the agencies or individual come forth with specific
proposals for the improvement of the Administrative Procedure Act, the
subcommittee would feel obligated to examine the proposed changes and
the reasons advanced for making them with the utmost care. Until that
is done, however, the subcommittee is unwilling to propose an overall revision of a .statute which has worked well, and which, given sympathetic
and imaginative interpretation, can work better. Academic niceties and
literary perfection are no adequate basis for general revision of the act,
especially when those revisions may well intensify the basic problem of
inability to get things done."
92. See P. L. 87-18 (April 7, 1961) which revives the President's power
under the Reorganization Act of 1949.
93. See 13 Ad. L. Rev. 236 (1961); 107 Cong. Rec. 10072.
94. See 107 Cong. Rec. 10082.
95. See N. Y. Times, June 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 3; 13 Ad. L. Rev. 318 (1961).
See, particularly, footnote 1 where it is stated: "Bills similar in effect, but
precluding delegation of rule making and providing greater rights of review by the full Commission, have been introduced in Congress."
96. See 107 Cong. Rec. 12085.
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cept a compromise on the plan submitted for the Federal Communications Commission."
Finally, mention must be made of one of the more controversial measures introduced at the present session of Congress. This is H. R. 6784 introduced by Representative Moulder
of Missouri, May 3, 1961 (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) which would
confer a "veto" power upon interested congressional committees over rules and regulations promulgated by Federal Administrative Agencies. The Administrative Law Section of the
American Bar Association has condemned this proposal " and,
at the last session of the House of Delegates of the ABA at
St. Louis, Missouri, August 7-11, 1961, its recommendation to
oppose H. R. 6784 was endorsed.
The future of the administrative process in the federal government is going to be determined by the disposition of these
numerous proposals. It has been demonstrated that the process can be useful and developed along lines which preserve
our traditional separation of powers without interfering with
its efficiency. The benefits which have been achieved should
be retained and improved. I venture to suggest it is the duty
of every lawyer to be interested in these proposals to the end
that administrative agencies cannot exercise their powers in
such a manner as to violate the rights, liberties and privileges
of the citizens. I have been emphasizing the responsibility of
the Bar in the efforts to improve the Administrative Process.
What contribution can be made by the Judiciary? As Mr. Justice Stone reminds us, "Court and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent instrumentalities of justice."
I am sure that it is a source of satisfaction that the new
Administrative Conference is modeled upon the Judicial Conference. As you can appreciate, however, the establishment of
a Conference is merely the starting point. One of the outstanding achievements of the Judicial Conference in recent
years was the Prettyman Report of 1951, which dealt with
practices and procedures in anti-trust and other protracted
cases, including those arising in the Administrative Agencies.
Rule 18 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit is a response to that report. This rule, and its counterpart
in other circuits, was designed to expedite the consideration
97. See S. 2034 which passed the House and Senate and is now awaiting
President Kennedy's action. See N. Y. Times, August 23, 1961.
98. See 13 Ad. I Rev. 209 et. seq. (1961).
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of review of cases arising in the Administrative Agencies. The
rule requires a concise statement of the questions to be presented and the holding of pre-hearing conferences to simplify
the issues and abbreviate the record. The rule is a salutary
attempt to minimize delays in the judicial review of the administrative determinations. But the enactment and enforcement of such rules are not sufficient. The courts should exert
moral suasion to curtail prolix administrative records. Judicial
disapprobation of such records, I venture to suggest, will do
more to eliminate irrelevant material and save the time of
litigants, agencies, and the courts than positive rules. Finally,
Judges should be critical of infringement of the rights of individuals in order to insure fairness of the Administrative
Process.
As lawyers and judges, we should be alert in the defense of
those principles which we believe are essential to our American way of life. The late Chief Justice Vanderbilt of our State
of New Jersey, in an article written 23 years ago, reminded
us that the lawyers and judges of sixteenth century England
"met the challenge of another body of Administrative Law".
I quote from the Chief Justice:
"Maitland, in his Rede lecture, has shown how the common lawyers of the sixteenth century met the challenge
of another body of administrative law, in Chancery, in
the Star Chamber and in the Privy Council-and to the
great advantage of the common law. Then, as now, the
administration of the common law left much to be desired. Then, as now, what was needed was more administration in the courts of justice and more of the fundamental principles of justice in the administrative tribunals. The common lawyers of the sixteenth century met
their problems and mastered them. The challenge of today is so clear that it does not need to be stated. The only
question is can we meet it ?"'
The individual lawyer should of course work the organized
bar. This defense is not the job of the American Bar Association alone; it requires the coordinated effort of the State and
Local Bar Associations. If we restrict our suggestions to the
delegated legislative and adjudicative powers and the limitations on the lawful exercise of executive power, we will be in
99. Vanderbilt, The Place of the Administrative Tribunal In
System, 24 A.1.A.J. 267, 273 (1938).
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the realm of law where the organized bar has the right and
duty to speak. The future of the administrative process is
important not alone to our clients but to all citizens and, in my
humble opinion, to our American way of life.

"The arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to
what is law; and it was for this purpose that arbitrationwas
introduced,namely, that equity might prevail."
ARISTOTLE-Rhetoric, bk. 1, ch. 13.
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